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PANEL DISCUSSION
An opening observation by Solicitor General McCree in response to the
intervening commentators has been incorporated in his Commentary, as
printed above.
In response to Professor Goodman, Professor Tollett said"
I partially agree with your statement of why blacks are for racial balance,
to the extent that they are. They recognize that with so much racism left
in the society, the only way they can be sure that resources and serious-
ness are brought to bear on institutions where there is a black presence is
to insure that there is a white presence also. I see the busing proposition
primarily as a bargaining chip. Personally, I would be happy if I could
get an equal expenditure per pupil.
He added this comment about higher education:
I should say a word about predominantly black higher education institu-
tions. If you read what I have written about integration in higher educa-
tion,1 what I do is disassociate higher education from Green2 and Swann 3
and suggest that the freedom-of-choice principle certainly applies in
higher education, and that racial balance is not required there. It is not
commanded by the Constitution, and in the light of the special functions
that these institutions serve, there is nothing wrong with predominantly
black higher education institutions being identifiably black.
In answer to a question from the audience, Professor Goodman amp4fi~ed
his views on the question of the appropriate remedy after Brown:
You've really asked several questions. First of all, you don't like what I
said about voluntarism as an appropriate remedy for desegregation. You
suggest that voluntarism is essentially what we adopted under the pupil-
placement laws that were enacted in the South shortly after the Brown
decision as a means of evasion. You're implying that surely I don't
approve of those things, so how can I approve of voluntarism in general.
Second, I am not sure what you meant wnen you said that desegregation
hasn't worked. I'll speak to that in a second about what it means to say
"worked" because I think your statement that "we've tried this and we've
1. Eg.. Tollett, Black Institutions of Higher Learning: Inadvertent Victins or Necessary Sac-
rifices?, 3 BLACK L.J. 162 (1974); Toilet, Blacks, Higher Education and Integration, 48 NOTRE
DAME LAW, 189 (1972).
2. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
3. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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tried the other thing and that none of them have worked, so what else can
we do," is one of roots of the whole problem.
But first, here is another answer. I do not approve of the pupil-placement
plans that immediately followed Brown and I do not approve of the varia-
tion of the pupil-placement plans that the Court struck down in Green. I
think that the Court was right in Green in 1968 in saying that this free-
dom-of-choice plan was no good. What was wrong with that plan, and
what was wrong with the previous pupil-placement plan, is that they set
up schools that were labeled white and black. This was just the old fash-
ioned southern-style de jure segregation with one additional wrinkle that
said "you are initially to be assigned to this black school and then you can
affirmatively opt out of it." That theory is no good because we started off
in a non-colorblind way identifying children and identifying schools by
race. It isn't enough, then, to say that if you want to, you can opt out.
What I am advocating is a system that assigns children initially on a non-
racial colorblind basis to their schools, geographically if you like, and
then offers them the opportunity to opt out of those schools and into
others that have racial compositions favorable to them, in their own view.
You probably would say that that won't "work" either. By "work," what
you mean is simply to bring about maximum feasible racial balance. I
am not suggesting that if you have only voluntarism, you will get, through
the operation of parental choice, the result that the Supreme Court is now
ordering as a matter of judicial mandate. I am saying that that ought not
to be the objective, that the proper objective-that is, the appropriate
function of a constitutional remedy-is simply to make certain that no
black student who wants to attend a school in which there is a predomi-
nance of whites, or some whites, or whatever they may prefer, will be
deprived of that opportunity. And it "works" if it accomplishes that re-
sult, even if it does not accomplish the result of producing any particular
racial composition.
Professor Tolleti added this observation on the remedy question:
There's a point I do want to make that is related to what you said and the
last question. I think that Burger was quite correct in the Swann case
when he said that just as race may be taken into account in determining
whether there has been a constitutional violation, it also has to be taken
into account in fashioning a remedy. I think it is extremely difficult at
this stage in our history to be racially neutral and at the same time do
justice to blacks, to Chicanos, and to others who have been oppressed for
years and years, such as women in the employment situation and, to a
lesser extent, in education.
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A member of the audience wondered if the remedy problem would have
been largely solved if the Rodriguez case had come out the other way on
erpenditure equalization. I
Professor Goodman responded-
The broader question, of which the Rodriguez case was one aspect, is
whether or not education is such an important value in our society, that
there is a constitutional right on the part of every school child to have
equality in the amount of school facilities that are allocated to him. That
is one way of putting one aspect of the Rodriguez issue. I take it that your
point is that if the Court had held that there is a right to equality in the
distribution of school resources, it would have solved the problem that the
Court failed to solve in the Brown and post-Brown desegregation litiga-
tion.
I suppose that if you assume, as many blacks and whites do, and as Pro-
fessor Tollett said a few minutes ago that he does, that the principal value
in desegregation or racial balance is to assure all children an equal share
of the economic resources of the school district-if that is the reason why
you want integration-then I suppose you are right. A Supreme Court
decision holding that there is a right to equality in the resources and pro-
viding effective means of policing that right, would have been an appro-
priate and adequate substitute for desegregation.
Professor Kurland noted that a major desegregation case had been pro-
ceeding in Los Angeles despite the earlier victory in Serranofor the equal
eipenditure princple, and said of that principle:
It may satisfy the equal distribution problem-the economic problem-
but I think there are more problems involved than the economic problem
and I think that the California experience proves that.
Professor Tollett added this response to the same question:
I would look at Rodriguez a little differently. I think the three-tiered ap-
proach to interpreting constitutional questions got the Court into some
difficulty. I think the Supreme Court of the United States could have
come out in essentially the same place that the Supreme Court of Califor-
4. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the
Supreme Court held that different levels of educational spending by local school districts with
different levels of assessed property value did not violate the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Earlier, the California Supreme Court had ruled the other way in Serrano v.
Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971), basing its decision on the state constitution rather than on the four-
teenth amendment.
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nia came out if the court had not started off by trying to determine if
education was a fundamental right. It seems to me that the Court could
have stated that there was a need for equal expenditure without determin-
ing that education was a fundamental right and I think it would have
advanced us a long way in providing equality.
I would like to qualify my agreement with Professor Kurland, as indi-
cated at the beginning. A certain amount of personal association is also
required, and the Brown opinion was not a bad opinion in its reference to
the intangible aspects of equal educational opportunity. There is a little
more to it than economics; you need freedom of association, too. I think
that if you could have the free choice to go to a school, and then have
equal expenditure as well, you would be all right.
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